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*cc'd*  
2 JUL 1959

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN (Ret)  
The Mayflower Hotel  
Washington 6, D. C.

Dear Raddy:

Many thanks for your letter of 26 June and the copy of the talk that you gave before the Economic Club in Detroit.

Foster's speeches and statements over the past six years are very numerous and some selection should be made but I think your idea is a good one.

I deeply appreciate your expression of appreciation for his work and it was certainly thoughtful of you to let me know of your feelings.

With every best wish and kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

ARTHUR W. RADFORD  
THE MAYFLOWER HOTEL  
WASHINGTON 6, D.C.

Executive Registry

11-5824

26 June 1959

Dear Allen:

It was very thoughtful of you to send me the picture taken during the funeral services for Foster. I am sure you know I shall always treasure the association I enjoyed with him, and how very deeply I still feel his loss. Our country has truly been deprived of one of its greatest leaders, and even though this picture is of a most sorrowful event, it has a special place in my album as evidence of our gathering together to pay our final respects.

Perhaps I should also at this time mention to you that while making a speech at the Economic Club in Detroit I made a reference to Foster, which was very well received. Maybe you would care to see it—and I hope somewhere along the line a complete set of Foster's speeches, comments, etc, are being complied.

With all the best as always,

Sincerely,

*Radford*

The Honorable  
Allen W. Dulles,  
Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency,  
Washington, D. C.

ADDRESS BY  
ADMIRAL ARTHUR W. RADFORD, USN(RET),  
BEFORE THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF DETROIT,  
FOR ARMED FORCES WEEK,  
MONDAY, MAY 11, 1959,  
Detroit, Michigan.

CAN OUR ARMED FORCES MEET THE CHALLENGE OF A SUCCESSION OF BERLINS

Thank you very much, Colonel Cisler, and I appreciate this citation to add to my collections. It will always remind me of a very pleasant day.

President Crow, members of The Economic Club of Detroit:  
The question you have asked me to discuss -- "Can Our Armed Forces Meet the Challenge of a Succession of Berlins?" -- has great significance on this particular day. First of all, we meet here to honor the Armed Forces of the United States, collectively and individually.

These are the same Armed Forces on which we must rely to back up the words of our diplomats as they convene this very day in Geneva for the Foreign Ministers' Conference. It is not without significance that at this Conference, at the elbow of our Secretary of State, are senior representatives of the Secretary of Defense, as there should always be in high level diplomatic conferences with the Communists. No foreign policy can be evolved in today's world by the diplomats alone.

And I might mention here that Secretary McElroy had expected to be in Geneva today with Secretary Herter, but the tragic loss of his Deputy Secretary last Friday has prevented him from going and he may go next Wednesday, or he may have to stay behind.

The present Berlin crisis triggered today's Conference, in Geneva. It is but one of many crises since the end of World War II. It is neither the first nor in my judgment will it be the last.

In each one of these crises the Armed Forces of the United States stood at the ready. While our diplomats, in each instance of crisis, tried with words of sweet reasonableness to negotiate agreements for lasting world peace, your Armed Forces stood behind them -- a powerful warning to those who would abandon the conference table for the battlefield. We do well to pay them special honor today. I would like to have you join with me in saluting them, wherever they may be in this wide, wide world. (Applause)

As the Council of Foreign Ministers in Geneva opens its deliberations, I think it might be wise for you and for me to ponder on how it all began -- how the Communists at the close of World War II started us down the road toward unilateral disarmament. This was a road paved with Communist promises and guttered with free world concessions -- a road which if followed would surely have led to the elimination of the United States, and with our demise, to Communist world domination.

I would like to pay tribute at this point to a farsighted architect and builder of United States foreign policy -- a man whose whole life has been dedicated to peace with justice -- but who, nevertheless, recognized the dangers of unilateral disarmament as quickly as any military man, and quicker than most.

I would like to have you listen as I read the farsighted words of this man -- a United States Senator -- as he addressed the Senate just ten years ago. See if you can identify him as I read:

"Following the San Francisco Conference (where the United Nations was born) came the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, in September, 1945. I attended that meeting with Secretary Byrnes. There we made a memorable decision. There we determined that the United States would not, in time of peace, go on, as at Teheran and Yalta, making concessions in order to buy from Soviet leaders a facade of harmony and agreement. That was a necessary decision. It is a decision which I suppose the Senate would ordinarily applaud, but it was a decision that involved fateful consequences. One of those consequences was an increased need for collective self-defense. For, once the Soviet leaders saw that they could no longer make great gains by tactics that partook of blackmail, they dropped the pretense of friendship, and opened up cold war with fury."

In all my life as a military man, I never met anyone who was more dedicated to the cause of peace than this former United States Senator -- nor did I ever meet anyone who understood so well that peace cannot be bought from Communism at the price of one-way concessions. The name of this great and consistent American? -- John Foster Dulles. (Applause) I am sure that he would appreciate the tribute paid to him here today.

The speech I quoted from was Mr. Dulles' first major speech as a Senator. He took the floor at the urging of both his Republican and Democratic colleagues -- to speak in behalf of our first great regional security pact, the North Atlantic Treaty.

At the time he spoke, in July, 1949, the first Berlin crisis--the one of the famous airlift which lasted well over a year--had receded into an agreement of another Council of Foreign Ministers, that was held in Paris in May, 1949.

That Paris agreement, which seems plain enough for all the world to understand, provided that there would be free movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern Zones and the Western Zones, and between the Zones and Berlin. At the same time it imposed on each occupying power, including the Soviet Union:

" . . . the obligation to take the measures necessary to insure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water and road transport for such movement of persons and goods and such communications by post, telephone and telegraph."

It is that plain obligation, solemnly entered into, on which the Soviet Union today, in Naval language, seeks "to walk back the cat." Thus, we are opening up a conference where one party to a multilateral agreement has announced its intention of denouncing that agreement and relieving itself of its obligations thereunder.

This is an old and familiar situation and one which we have faced many times with the Soviet Union. We faced up to it, for instance, at the time of the first Berlin Blockade. Then we refused to accept unilateral Soviet revision of multilateral agreements. We backed up our refusals with our Armed Forces -- the same Armed Forces you honor today. Our Air Force and Navy planes supplied Berlin. Our B-29 bombers moved to England. We broke the Berlin Blockade -- temporarily -- for ten years is not a very long time in the Soviet lexicon.

Today once more the Soviet Union is making demands that we yield a rightful and legal position to a threat of force. One more the question is on many tongues: Are our Armed Forces of today equal to the task of deterring the use of force to decide the issue?

Not long ago the Chiefs of Staff of all our Armed Forces were called before an investigating committee of the United States Senate to answer the same kind of \$64-question, the same question that Mr. Crow has posed for me. One of the Senators asked Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations:

"What are the alternatives that we have in Berlin? Do we indeed have any alternatives?"  
I feel certain that all the Chiefs would join with Admiral Burke in his answer.

Admiral Burke first described Khrushchev's aims -- namely the abrogation of existing treaties, by turning control of access to Berlin over to the East Germans -- an aim calculated to reduce the prestige influence of the United States. (Mr. Forrestal, eleven years ago in the first Berlin crisis, said the aim was to make "the U. S. a vassal staying in Berlin by sufferance rather than by right.")

Admiral Burke then laid out the alternatives to the Senators: "Either we accept (the Soviet aim) and knuckle under -- or we don't. If we knuckle under, the succeeding steps, the succeeding pressures in other areas are going to come faster and faster.

"By knuckling under in Berlin, in Quemoy, and in all of the other places where things are going to occur and have occurred in the past, we will lose a little bit of support each time, a little bit of prestige -- and we will become smaller and smaller and smaller both in our influence and in our prestige. We can't permit that. We have got to stand."

Then he added this significant comment --to which I heartily subscribe:

"If Russia wants to make a point of it, if they want to start a war over (Berlin), they will start a war. -- But, if they want to start a war, they will start it whether it is over (Berlin) or some other point."

In other words, he was saying that the Soviets will start a war only when they want to -- and at a time, of course, when they think they can win.

In my considered judgment they will not choose the time of the present Berlin crisis. They will not choose it because of the great strength of our Armed Forces which are today fully capable of meeting the challenge of the Berlin crisis. We in America must see to it that this condition of our Armed Forces is never allowed to change.

I believe that our planned military programs will give us the necessary strength to meet a succession of Berlin crisis. I believe this not only from my knowledge of those programs but from my confidence in our military-civilian leadership.

I know every one of the Chiefs of Staff personally. When men of the caliber of General Twining, General Taylor, Admiral Burke, General White and General Pate join together and state, as they recently did, that our proposed expenditure for next year "is adequate to provide for the essential programs necessary for the defense of the nation" -- then you can feel secure. Furthermore, I believe that men of integrity, such as those who today lead our Armed Forces, will speak out whenever they don't think the country's defenses are adequate.

The careers and the lives of our military leaders are dedicated to but one thing -- the defense of their country. You may rest assured that these men will let you know whenever they think the security of the nation is in jeopardy.

In recent weeks The Economic Club of Detroit received a factual accounting of our military strength -- present and planned -- from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Neil McElroy. I will not presume to render a further accounting because I am no longer in active military service. I would like to say just a few words, however, about another subject -- touched on by Secretary McElroy.

I refer to the subject of military assistance to our Allies. I am, as a private citizen, a member of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program -- the so-called Draper Committee. I believe I am the first member of that Committee to report to this distinguished audience.

Our Committee, since it was chartered by the President in November of last year, has devoted itself to study, discussion and investigation of military aid to foreign nations. Our membership was bipartisan in political make-up and nonpartisan in approach. It included a group of hard-headed Americans, which I think you could match in this audience today. On it served the President of the Chase Manhattan Bank, two former Directors of the Bureau of the Budget (one of them Mr. Joe Dodge, of your city), and a former Commander of NATO. They are not the type who would be apt to endorse a program which could be --and his mistakenly been -- labelled as a "giveaway".

After months of examination of witnesses -- of travel to the front lines of military assistance -- Taiwan, Korea, Turkey, Greece (I myself went to the Middle East) the Committee concluded in a recent report to the President:

"We are all convinced that the Mutual Security Program both in its military and its economic aspects is a sound concept. What is needed is the determination to continue it and the ability to administer it well."

The Draper Committee was convinced of the soundness of the program by many things, not the least of which was the solid record of accomplishment of our policy of collective self-defense-- implemented as it is by military assistance. This is the same policy of collective self-defense to which Mr. Dulles referred on the floor of the Senate in 1949 -- it is the same policy of collective self-defense which saved Greece and Turkey from being engulfed by Communism --as well as Taiwan, South Korea and countless other areas of the free world. It is, finally, the same policy of collective self-defense which has kept us from fighting a general war -- which I believe would surely have come by now -- without such a policy.

In business before you make a decision to expand one line at the expense of another line -- you always consider the alternatives; such as what your competitors may do, and what your action to cut out a line that has been a proven profit maker, may do to your whole profit picture.

In Mutual Security, we should as a nation consider the alternatives. Military Assistance has been a profit maker for America. It has returned rich dividends in the lives of our own Armed Forces -- it has provided much less expensive insurance for our survival. Before any decision is made to turn those dividends into other channels -- we should take a good, hard look at where such diversion of profits would leave the security of the nation. The Draper Committee summed up its conclusion on this score in these words:

"The only alternative we can see to the interdependent allied free world, strengthened by our aid where needed, would be the Fortress America concept (or) taking our first stand in the last ditch."

Our people are asking, however, "How long must this military assistance go on?" To this I can only answer -- so long as we need strong military forces of our own -- based and integrated as they must be with the forces of our free world allies.

Our military appropriations for our own defense forces and our yearly contributions for military material and training assistance to the collective security effort are as President Eisenhower recently put it: "but two elements in a single defense effort".

When you buy an insurance policy for your factory, you continue to pay the premiums so long as you think the threat of fire is great enough to warrant the expense. The military threat of Communism has not decreased since we took out the first Mutual Defense Insurance Policy ten years ago. It has increased. This is no time to be cutting the cheapest kind of insurance we can buy.

If America and the free world are to be able to meet the challenge of a succession of Berlins -- to go back to the basic question -- then we must keep the Armed Forces we honor here today stronger than those of the Soviet Union-- and we must continue to contribute to the strength of those forces by a program of military assistance to our Allies. These are the twin prerequisites of a successful military policy and a condition precedent to a successful foreign policy.



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